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C
urrent economic fashion appears to be preoccupied with what is perceived as emerging trade blocs. Europe, it is argued, is preoccupied with the completion of the single market. The share of intra-regional trade in total exports has risen constantly from 53% in 1985 to 60% in 1989 and 63% in the first six months of 1991.1 IntraEuropean trade flows of more than $ US 1 trillion in 1990 and 1991 are unrivaled anywhere else in the world. Their predominance does tempt one to conclude that Europe is inward-looking and that the realization of the single market takes place at the expense of Europe's competitive position in overseas markets. The opening up of Central and Eastern European countries and their orientation towards Western Europe further adds to the Euro-centric argument.
Europe's third country trade is modest, indeed, in comparison to its total trade and in per capita terms. Third country exports per European, at $ US 1358 in 1990, were well below those per Japanese ($ 2330) and only slightly higher than those of North Americans' third country trade ($1242) .
This applies also to Europe's trade with the fast-growing Asia Pacific region: Western European imports from France are equivalent to its total imports from the 11 major economies in the Asia Pacific region (Japan, China, EANIEs 2 and ASEAN).
9 International Trade Centre UNCTAD/GAI-r, Geneva, Switzerland. This paper is a revised version of a lecture given at the Euro-Asia Centre of I NSEADon 14 February 1992. The statistical work and the preparation of graphs was largely done by Alexander Bushaev.
A similar argument applies to the Asia Pacific region 9 For Asian firms, other Asian countries are by far the most important export market and source of imports. IntraAsian trade, at $ US 280 bn., exceeded bilateral trade with North America by two thirds and was more than twice as high as that with Western Europe.
The focus on intra-regional developments creates an image of mutual distance and limited exchange between the two regions. This image is, however, incomplete and hides some significant recent developments.
The present paper tries to provide an overview of the recent evolution in trade between Pacific Asia and Western Europe. It attempts to puts orders of magnitude and trends into a realistic perspective and it argues that rapid growth of intra-regional trade is not necessarily incompatible with increasing international competitiveBess. 3 The paper draws on data from the OECD for bilateral trade flows with OECD countries (Monthly Statistics, Series A), IMF data for bilateral trade flows of non-OECD countries (Direction of Trade Statistics), EU ROSTAT database COMEXT on CD-ROM (for EEC data by countries and commodities) and UNDIESAprojections 1991 to 1995 (model LINK). There are some discrepancies between these sources. As they do not affect the principal argument in this paper, no effort has been made to explain and reconcile these discrepancies. For more details on these sources, cf. E von Kirchbach : Foreign Trade Statistics, AGuide for Market Research and Trade Promotion, International Trade Centre UNCTAD/GATI" 1992 (forthcoming). 1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 It goes without saying that both regions are extremely heterogeneous, and that economic aggregates for each region hide stark differences in development within each region. Yet there is a clear trend towards more cohesiveness within each of thetwo regions, a trend which justifies deploying the following arguments at the level of aggregated trade flows.
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In open economies, trade data 3 provide a fairly good picture of the competitiveness and the integration of countries into the international division of labour, provided that import-substituting foreign investment remains low. This holds true basically for Japanese imports and developing Asia's exports. For Japanese exports, however, trade data underestimates the strength of the Japanese economy. In 1990, the overseas production of Japanese firms was estimated at half the value of national exports." The same argument applies, to a lesser extent, to the imports of most of the developing countries of the region, which consist to a non-negligible extent of imports by transnational firms from Japan, the USA, other developing countries in Asia, and Europe.
Europe's Dynamic Export Drive
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Europe has successfully built up its position in the Asia Pacific Region over the second half of the 1980s. It doubled its share of Japanese imports from 6% to 12%, increased its share of 246 imports by the EANIEs by two percentage points to 11% and maintained its share of 12% in ASEAN. In China, the EC had overtaken both the USA and Japan in terms of import market share in 1990. By the turn of the decade, the EC had become a respectable Pacific power, with an import market share in the 11 countries (Japan, China, EANIEs, ASEAN) of 12% as compared to a US share of 16% (cf. Table 1 ).
Europe also did well in terms of geographic diversification. It significantly increased its share of imports by the two most dynamic players, namely Japan and the EANIEs, each of which absorbed one third of sharply over the second half of the 1980s (cf. Table 2 ).
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In terms of increasing its import market share in the region, Europe has clearly been the most dynamic of the three triadic players. This is even more remarkable as the dollar value of the region's imports soared by an annual 16% over the second half of the 1980s. This performance certainly attests to the export competitiveness of Europe and puts it into the same league as the USA in Asian import markets.
Asia's Impressive Exports
Asian exports to Europe (in nominal dollars) grew by Over the second half of the 1980s, the sources of Western European imports from Asia became more balanced. Japan's share declined by seven percentage points to less than half, while China and the EANIEs increased their share notably (cf. Table 2 ).
The 1980s witnessed a pronounced redirection of Asian exports. Over the first half, the Asia Pacific share made rapid strides in US imports and Japanese imports, but changed little in the EC. The opposite held true in the second half of the 1980s: Asian penetration of US and Japanese imports stagnated, but increased drastically in Europe. Again, this applied not only to Japan, but to the entire region. The sequencing in export market development, beginning with the USA before shifting to the EC, was thus similar for Japanese and EANIE exporters. 
Effect of German Reunification
In 1990, Asia Pacific registered a trade surplus of some $ US 60 bn. The surplus with North America alone was $ US 72 bn. and with Western Europe $ US 27 bn. (excluding the new L~.nder in Germany). These high bilateral surpluses were partly compensated for by the oilrelated trade deficit of $ US 30 bn. with the Middle East (cf. Table 4 ).
The situation deteriorated significantly over the year 1991 : Japan alone reported a trade surplus of $ US 78 bn., i. e. 50% more than the previous year. While the Japanese trade deficit with the USA remained stable in 1991, the rise affected in particular the EC. Its trade balance with Japan increased by half to reach $ US 27 bn, This reflects, on the one hand, a 9% reduction (!) of European exports to Japan (reflecting partly recession-reduced import demand in 
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Japan and reduced European art sales) and, on the other, a 10% rise in Japanese exports to Europe (partly reflecting the J-curve effect of the appreciation of the yen).5
Much of the additional EC imports are related to German reunification. As is well-known, German imports soared in 1990 and 1991. Significantly, the Asia Pacific region benefited to a large extent from this additional import demand. German imports from the region increased by a projected $ US 35 bn. in 1991 as compared to 1990, of which about one third came from Japan and two thirds from developing Asia2 Once economic recovery and reconstruction have picked up in Central and Eastern Europe, the Asia Pacific region is bound to participate actively. The present irrelevance of Central and Eastern Europe as a trade partner for Asia-for the time being it is less important than Africa-is likely to change.
A sectoral analysis of the changes in the Euro-Asian balance of trade identified product groups in which the balance of trade changed by more than ECU 100 m. between the first six months of 1989 and the first six months of 1991. The results are unequivocal:
Out of the 23 product groups identified -defined at the HS 2-digit level -there were only three in which the EC trade balance improved. These product groups were aircraft; silk products; and animal feed and food industry residues. The improvement of the EC balance of payments in the latter two groups was exclusively the result of reduced imports from the Asia Pacific region. The exceptional performance of the European aircraft industry, as compared to other European industries, immediately invokes parallels with the USA.
Product groups in which the Asia Pacific region has significantly improved its net export performance vis-a-vis Europe include: cars (HS 87); garments (HS 61 and 62); non-electric machinery (HS 84); consumer electronics and electric machinery (HS 85); footwear and leather articles (HS 42 and 64); and toys (HS 95). The broad range of products bears witness to the growing diversification of the region's competitive industries.
The decisive question will be to what extent Europe will be able to reverse its lacklustre third-country export performance in 1990/91 in particular with respect to the EANIEs. EANIE imports of manufactures were already in Table 5 ). In this respect, the EANIEs will be Asia's key and test market in the first half of the 1990s.
Conclusions
European and Asian firms have the advantage of a huge and rapidly integrating regional market in common, which absorbs over 60% and 40% of their exports respectively. This, however, has not prevented them from intensifying their trade relations over the second half of the 1990s. Europe has significantly increased its market share in the region to about 12%, and the 11 Asia Pacific countries under review have reached a market share of 9% in total European imports. The process of mutual market penetration has overall advanced in parallel.
The rapid increase in Euro-Asian trade has, indeed, led to the second major shift in the relative importance of trade within the triangle Western Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific region: Euro-Asian trade surpassed, for the first time, transatlantic trade. Within little more than one decade, transatlantic trade was thus relegated from the first to the last position in triadic trade relations.
It is true that the good performance of European trade is not matched as far as investment is concerned: European foreign direct investment in Asia remains far belowthat of Japan, the USA and other Asian countries, and continues to fall back. This trend, however, should be interpreted cautiously. One may very well argue that, firstly, European -and in particular German -firms have traditionally shown a high exports-to-foreign-investment ratio, and that, S o u r c e : projection by UN DIESA, LINK, 1991. N o t e : Singapore included in both EANIEs and ASEAN. secondly, the significant intra-European investment is a major factor towards strengthening the international competitiveness of Europe. In turn, the weak European foreign investment position in Asia should not be overemphasized as an indicator for European competitiveness in Asian markets.
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The second half of the 1980s witnessed a clear shift by the Asian export drive from the USA to Europe. Europe's trade deficit has markedly increased from 1985 to 1990 and has soared again in 1991. While this is related to a large extent to German reunification, it also reflects the growing competitiveness, diversification and complementarity within the Asia Pacific region.
Europe's trade deficit with Asia is likely to persist at least over the first half of the 1990s. From an economic point of view, such a bilateral deficit is not a reason for concern as long as there is no pronounced overall balance of trade deficit. At the political level, however, the order of magnitude of this deficit is likely to stir up reactions. It may very well reinforce tendencies towards raising European protectionism in its various forms, including industrial policy initiatives. This, in turn, is likely to further accelerate Asian investment in Western Europe, although such investment will not necessarily mitigate the balance of trade deficit. The political management of Europe's trade and investment deficit with Asia will be a key issue in EuroAsian relations in the first half of the 1990s. As long as business and economic determinants take precedence over political factors, however, the prospects for EuroAsian trade relations are very good.
In sum, the emergence of more cohesive trade areas notwithstanding, Europe is not only present in the Asia Pacific region, but Euro-Asian relations are likely to be the most dynamic element in i nterregional trade in the first half of the 1990s. What remains to be seen is whether the trade policy framework will be conducive or obstructive to this development.
